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STOCK DIVIDENDS AS PRINCIPAL OR INCOME IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUSTS
A TRUST is a device enabling one person to deal with
property for the benefit of another.' In its origin,
emphasis was laid upon the personal relation between the
trustee, the person holding the property in trust, and the
beneficiary, the person for whose benefit the property was
held in trust.2 As the modern trust has developed, the empha-
sis has shifted, so that today the trust is frankly a method
of disposing of property.3 It is this aspect of trusts, as
employed in family settlements or decedents' estates, that
will be emphasized in this discussion.
In the administration of the trust, the trustee is under a
number of duties to the beneficiary of the trust, once he has
accepted the trust. Among other things, he must render
clear and accurate accounts with respect to the administra-
tion of the trust; 4 he must use reasonable care and skill to
preserve the trust property; r he must use reasonable care
and skill to make the trust property productive; 6 he must
pay to the beneficiary at reasonable intervals the net income
of the trust property,7 etc. As thus enumerated, the task of a
trustee may appear to be an easy one, but, as a rule, the
trustee is beset with problems of conflicting loyalties, espe-
cially where there are successive beneficiaries.8 For example,
if a trustee is directed to pay the income to one beneficiary
during a designated period, and then, at the expiration of
the period, to pay the principal to another beneficiary, he
must act with due regard to the respective interests of the
life tenant and the remainderman. He must make the prop-
erty productive so that the life tenant will have a reasonable
income and he must preserve the trust property so that the
remainderman will have the estate that he is entitled to
'TRUSTS RESTAmTMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) 11-12.
'Id. at 12 and 21.
'Supra note 1.
" PERRY ON TRUSTS-passim.
r Ibid.
a Ibid.
7Ibid.
'TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) §224.
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receive. The safety of the principal must not be endangered
for the sake of increased income, and, on the other hand,
income must not be sacrificed to increase the value of the
principal. It becomes important, therefore, where there are
successive beneficiaries, to distinguish between what is
income belonging to the life tenant and what is principal
belonging to the remainderman. Money received as rent on
realty, or interest received on bonds and notes would clearly
represent income. In the case of dividends on stock of cor-
porations, it is not always a simple matter to determine
which beneficiary is entitled to receive such dividend. The
nature of the problems arising from dividend distributions
will be the subject of this discussion.
Income accrues to the life beneficiary from the date of
death of the testator, where the trust is created by will, so
that income received after the date of death may have to be
apportioned between income and principal. For example, a
testator leaves a -bond in trust, the interest being payable
January 1st and July 1st. The testator dies March 1st. When
"lhe trustee receives the July payment of interest, that por-
tion of the payment representing interest accrued from Janu-
ary 1st to March 1st is principal, and the portion accruing
from March 1st to July 1st is income. The trustee will be
obliged to make an apportionment of the July 1st payment
of income to reflect the respective interests of the income
beneficiary and the remainderman. Rents and annuities as
well as interest are apportionable.9
The difference between such income and the return on
shares of stock arises chiefly from the nature of an invest-
ment in a corporation. Such an investment is usually repre-
sented by certificates of stock, showing the interest of the
shareholder in the capital and surplus of the corporation.
The return of the shareholder takes the form of a dividend,
representing a distribution among the shareholders accord-
ing to their respective interests, from the profits and surplus
of the corporation. 10 Such a distribution may be made only
when authorized by a valid resolution of the board of direc-
Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. See also UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME ACT, §4.
'BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, 311.
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tors.1 The effect of a declaration of a dividend is to create a
liability of the corporation to its stockholders and to reduce
the net worth of the corporation by reducing its surplus. A
dividend may be declared out of current earnings (profits)
or accumulated earnings (surplus). If a trustee holds stock
for a designated period and a dividend has been declared to
stockholders of record during such designated period, pay-
able in cash, such a dividend is income payable to the bene-
ficiary. It should be noted that such cash dividend by
reducing the surplus has reduced the net worth of the cor-
poration, and consequently the value of each individual
share. If the dividend has been covered by current earnings,
the reduction in net worth will not affect the value of the
individual shares held by the trustee. If the dividend has
been declared out of accumulated earnings, the value of the
individual shares may be impaired by the reduction in net
worth. Such impairment obviously affects the remainderman
and so creates the confusion that courts have labored under
in determining the apportionment or distribution of divi-
dend income.
In spite of the possibility that the corpus of an estate
may thus be impaired by the declaration of an ordinary cash
dividend, courts are agreed that ordinary cash dividends rep-
resent income that should be distributed to the life tenant.12
However, in the case of an extraordinary cash dividend,
courts are divided as to the proper distribution, and so have
evolved two different rules.
One rule, the Pennsylvania rule, is to consider as income
only that portion of the dividend that was earned by the
corporation subsequent to the acquisition of the stock by the
trustee. The rule was first enunciated in Ecrp's Appeal 13
and the effect of the rule is to consider the source of the
dividend: The money value of the stock at the beginning of
the estate is considered the corpus of the estate, and this
value is kept intact.
The second rule considers all cash dividends, however
large, as income. The form, rather than the source of the
u Ibid.
"Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 AtI. 883 (1900).
"28 Pa. 368 (1857).
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dividend, controls. The theory of this rule is that in the case
of a cash or property dividend there is an actual severance of
the subject of the dividend from the corporation assets for
the benefit of the stockholders. The leading case is Minot v.
Paine.14 It would appear that the Pennsylvania rule is fairer
to the life tenant and remainderman, although its applica-
tion is often difficult and might involve considerable investi-
gation into the finances of the corporation declaring the
dividend.
Consider next the case of a stock dividend. Such a divi-
dend differs from a cash dividend in that the liability to the
stockholders created by the board of directors is liquidated
not in cash but in stock of the corporation declaring the
dividend. From an accounting standpoint, the effect of the
declaration and payment of the dividend is to reduce the
surplus of the corporation and to increase the outstanding
capital stock. Stated differently, a certain portion of the
surplus has been capitalized, with the result that the net
worth of the corporation remains the same after the payment
of the stock dividend as before the declaration of the divi-
dend. From the point of view of the individual stockholders,
their interests in the corporation remain proportionately the
same, except that such interests are now represented by a
larger number of certificates. For the reason that there has
been a distribution of a surplus and, in effect, a reinvestment
of such surplus in the corporation, it might be said that the
stockholders have received income. Such had been the view
of Congress which taxed stock dividends as income under the
Revenue Act of 1916.15 However, the Supreme Court, in
Eisner v. Macomber,6 held that stock dividends were not
income and, therefore, could not be subject to an income tax.
Applying the reasoning of the Court to the administration of
estates, it might be said that, since stock dividends are not
income, they should be considered as part of the principal
belonging to the remainderman. Courts, however, have
divided on the question. The Pennsylvania rule, mentioned
"99 Mass. 101 (1868).
2'39 Stat. 756 (1916).
" 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).
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above, considers a stock dividend as income to the extent
that such dividend has been declared out of earnings of the
corporation which have accrued subsequent to the acquisi-
tion of the shares by the trustee. This rule has been accepted
in a number of jurisdictions.17 New York courts followed
this rule in the Matter of Osborne.'3 In this case, the princi-
pal part of an estate held in trust consisted of 3,000 shares
of the capital stock of the Singer Manufacturing Company.
The trust estate was created in 1908 at the time of the testa-
tor's death. At that time the corporation had a surplus of ac-
cumulated earnings amounting to thirty-seven million dollars
and a capital of thirty million dollars. By June, 1910, the
surplus of the corporation had increased to $51,500,000. Dur-
ing that month the corporation declared a stock dividend of
thirty million dollars. Prior to the payment of the stock divi-
dend, regular cash dividends were paid to the executor, who
distributed such dividends to the life beneficiary. The ques-
tion at issue was whether the life beneficiary is entitled to'
the whole of the stock dividend.
The court held that ordinary cash dividends should be
paid to the life beneficiary regardless of the time when the
surplus out of which the dividends are payable was accumu-
lated. As to the stock dividend, the court apportioned the
dividend between the beneficiary of the life estate and the
corpus, the basis of the division being that the surplus earned
after the creation of the testator's trust should be awarded
to the life beneficiary, and the portion earned prior to the
creation of the trust should go to the trust fund itself for the
benefit of the remainderman. This follows the Pennsylvania
rule.
The Massachusetts rule, already referred to in the case
of extraordinary cash dividends, considers stock dividends as
principal for the reason that such dividends do not represent
money or property actually severed from capital assets. This
rule has been followed in numerous cases.' 9 In a Missouri
case, Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Company,20 a testator
I' Supra note 8, at §228.
209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913).
"
1Supra note 17.
-317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91 (1927); POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 768.
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had placed his residuary estate in trust, the net income to be
paid in equal shares to his children aiQd their descendants,
per stirpes, until the death of the last surviving child, when
the then principal, and undistributed income were to be
divided equally per stirpes among- his grandchildren then
living. The trust estate consisted of 200 shares of stock of
the American Tobacco Company.
In May, 1920, fifteen months after the testator's death,
and in March, 1921, the tobacco company declared a 75%
and 3% stock dividend respectively. The stocks were issued
to the trustees of the trust fund. The plaintiffs included
three of the- children and they contended that the stock
received as dividends was income within the meaning of the
will and, as such, should go to the life beneficiary. The defen-
dants included the testamentary trustees, and minor grand-
children, and they contended that the stock received as divi-
dends constituted merely accretions to the principal of the
trust estate and, therefore, should go to the remainderman.
The court held that a scrutiny of the will did not reveal any
specific intention of the testator as to the disposition of
stock dividends and, therefore, the words "net income" had
to be given a meaning which the law gives them. In this
manner the court established the Missouri law to be the rule
usually referred to as the Massachusetts rule. In developing
its argument the court ably states the different rules obtain-
ing in different jurisdictions before positing its own rule. It
might be stated that, from an accounting viewpoint, the
creation of a liability to stockholders amounts to a severance
of the capital assets, even though no specific money or prop-
erty is actually set apart for the liquidation of the liability.
The fact that the liability is liquidated by a contribution of
the stockholders to the capital of the corporation, in effect
means that the stockholders have received the severed assets
of the corporation and then in effect purchased additional
stock from the corporation. In essence, the surplus has been
distributed and is no longer available for ordinary cash
dividends. To permit the distribution of current earnings
to be made in this manner results in a favoring of the remain-
dermen, to the detriment of life beneficiaries who may thus
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be deprived of all income on the shares of stock held by the
trustees, where the Massachusetts rule is followed.
Two jurisdictions, Kentucky and Delaware, have fol-
lowed a third rule. Under this ruling, no distinction is drawn
between cash or stock dividends. Any dividends from earn-
ings, cash or stock, ordinary or extraordinary, belong to
income, if declared during the term of the principal estate,
without regard to whether such earnings accrued prior or
subsequent to the creation of the trust. The leading case is
Hite v. Hite,21 and the rule has been followed in later cases.2"
In Goff v. Evans, the trust held 30 shares of Mt. Sterling
National Bank stock, upon which a 100% stock dividend was
declared in 1922. The executor, under the will of his mother
and also his father, asked the court for instructions as to the
distribution of the dividend. If the dividend was declared
to be income belonging to the life tenant, it would go to the
executor of the mother's estate and so be distributed, under
the mother's will, equally to all the children. If the dividend
was declared to be principal, it would be distributed, under
the will of the father, to four daughters. The Kentucky
court, following its own precedent, ruled that all dividends,
whether paid in stock or cash, belong to the life tenant and
directed the distribution to all seven children.
New York courts have at different times followed each
of the three rules. Prior to 1913, New York followed the
Kentucky rule.23 From 1913 to 1922 the courts followed the
Pennsylvania rule of apportionment. 4 In 1922 the legisla-
ture enacted Section 17A of the Personal Property Law,
which provides that a direction in a deed of trust thereafter
executed to the effect that all stock dividends be added to
principal, was not to be regarded as directing an invalid
accumulation. In 1926 this section was amended to read,
"Unless otherwise provided in a will, deed or other instru-
ment, which shall hereafter be executed and shall create or
declare a trust, any dividend which shall be payable in the
stock of the corporation or association declaring or author-
93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892).
Goff v. Evans, 217 Ky. 664, 290 S. W. 490 (1927). POWELL, op. cit.
supra note 20 at 764.
Note, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 775.
"Supra note 18.
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izing such dividend and which shall be declared or author-
ized hereafter in respect of any stock of such corporation
composing, in whole or in part, the principal of such trust,
shall be principal and not income of such trust. The addi-
tion of any such stock dividend to the principal of such
trust, as above provided, shall not be deemed an accumula-
tion of income within the meaning of this article."
The effect of this statute, as amended, was to make the
Massachusetts rule applicable in New York in situations
covered by the statute and in the absence of a contrary pro-
vision in the instrument creating the trust.
Several recent New York cases will now be considered
to show how courts are ruling with respect to the perplexing
question of the allocation of stock dividends. In Equitable
Trust Co. of New York v. Prentice 25 we have a decision by
the court regarding the allocation of stock dividends in a
trust deed, to which the statute is not applicable, the latter
having been first enacted in the year of 1922 and amended
in 1926.
In that case a deed of trust was made in the year 1917
which trust gave the net income of shares of stock to certain
beneficiaries with remainder over. By its terms the trustee
was to have the privilege, acting with the consent of others, to
allocate stock dividends to capital rather than to income.
This privilege was exercised. There was no question that the
allocation would be lawful if the trust had been created in
1922 or as amended by the laws of 1926. The question here
presented was whether the trust which was created in 1917
is to be condemned as an unlawful accumulation under a
trust founded prior to 1922. Prior to the enactment of the
statute, the rule was settled in this state that as between life
beneficiary and remainderman a stock dividend would be
apportioned as principal or income according to the origin
of the surplus out of which it was declared. To the extent
that it distributed a surplus existing at the creation of the
trust, stock dividends would be allocated to principal; to the
extent that it distributed a surplus earned thereafter, it
would be allocated to income. In other words, the Pennsyl-
-250 N. Y. 1, 164 N. E. 723 (1928).
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vania rule of apportionment was applied in New York before
the enactment of the statute.
The court held that the allocation of stock dividends to
the corpus of the estate, pursuant to the discretion granted
by the testator to the trustee, did not result in an unlawful
accumulation, even though the statute of 1922 or 1926 did
not apply to the facts of the case, the trust having been
created in 1917. The court points out that what is principal
for a shareholder may be income when held in trust to be
divided among others. And what is income for a corporation
may not be income for a shareholder.
In Pratt v. Ladd 26 Charles Pratt died in 1891, leaving a
will whereby he created trusts of his residuary estate for the
benefit of each of his eight children.
On June 5, 1925, each trust created by the will contained
7,500 shares of the Anglo-American Oil Company, an English
corporation. On that day the company declared a stock divi-
dend of 331/3% to each trust fund. This represented an item
of 495,000 pounds transferred to capital by the corporation.
The trustee considered the dividend as part of the principal.
Surplus out of which the dividend was declared arose out of
a transaction involving the borrowing of American dollars
in 1920, after the trust was created. At the time of payment,
an extraordinary profit was made on the exchange due to
the appreciation of the English currency.
The courts there laid down the rule that the corpora-
tion's resolution to consider the profit as a capital profit can-
not change the accumulated earnings into capital, as between
life tenant and the remainderman. Therefore, the court held
that the stock dividends declared by the English corporation,
representing profits earned through borrowing dollars and
making payment in pounds, goes to the life beneficiary of
stock under the testamentary trust. This case being one not
governed by the New York Statute, Personal Property Law,
17A, seemed to be decided either in accordance with the
Kentucky or the Pennsylvania rule.
In the Matter of Jackson2 7 decided January, 1932, one
Theodore F. Jackson, by his will and codicil executed in 1911
253 N. Y. 213, 170 N. E. 895 (1930).
258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and 1913 respectively, gave certain real and personal prop-
erty to his wife.
The residuary estate was placed in trust. Included in
the property held by the trust were 660 shares of stock in the
Vandervoort Realty Company. The Vandervoort Realty
Company declared a 100% stock dividend in 1927, which
dividend the widow now claims as "profits" and which the
remainderman claims as "capital."
The court upheld the contention of the widow and
awarded all the stock dividends to her for the reason that
the dividends were declared out of the surplus earnings
accruing after the trustee received the stock. An advan-
tageous sale of land, made immediately before the dividend
was declared, created a large surplus. Apparently a profit
may result from the operations of a business, and may include
the sale at a profit of capital assets. It should be noted that
the corpus of the estate was in no way impaired by distrib-
uting the dividend to the life tenant. This case, the statute
not being applicable, also followed the Pennsylvania rule, or
the Kentucky rule. Had the will creating the trust come
under the New York statute, the stock dividend would have
gone to the remainderman, following the Massachusetts rule.
The Reporter and Advisers in submitting their draft on
this aspect of the restatement of the law of trusts found
themselves evenly divided between the Pennsylvania rule of
apportionment of extraordinary cash dividends and stock
dividends and the Massachusetts rule, and, therefore, sub-
mitted both rules governing receipts from shares of stock,
Section 228 and an alternative section. The Massachusetts
rule is followed in the proposed Uniform Principal and In-
come Act.28
It is felt that the Pennsylvania rule is the most realistic
of the three rules that courts have applied in the case of the
distribution of stock dividends. Such a rule is based upon
the scientific analysis of the financial condition of the corpo-
ration issuing the dividend, and is in accord with the prin-
ciples of accounting, which latter courts have recently been
adopting more and more as principles of law.
Supra note 9.
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The Massachusetts rule is an attempt at a simplification
of the problem. Courts have fought shy of becoming involved
in mathematical computations and have preferred to adopt a
rule of thumb rather than attempt economic and scientific
analyses.
The Kentucky rule is an oversimplilication of the prob-
lem, and while it may have resulted in doing justice in
individual cases, its application would in the long run be
disastrous.
While in New York the statute follows the Massachu-
setts rule in the case of trusts created prior to 1922, the New
York courts may be obliged to follow either the Pennsylvania
or the Kentucky rules set up by them in earlier cases.
BENJAMIN HARROW.
St. John's University School of Law,
October 31, 1933.
